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BIANNUAL SURVEY
to the scope of the statutory language,"7 although it is agreed
that the legislature did intend the notice to be available in any
action.T"
CPLR 308(3): Substituted service.
In Huntington Utilities Fuel Corp. v. McLoughlin,7 9 an action
to impose a trust on lands allegedly purchased with money taken
from the plaintiffs, defendants moved to dismiss on the ground
of insufficient service. They contended that substituted service
was not available where the number of times that plaintiffs attempted
personal service did not amount to "due diligence." 80 In refusing
to set aside service, the court held that it would not adjudicate
the question of "due diligence" where the parties disagree simply
about the number of attempts at personal service which must be
shown to permit the employment of substituted service.
The number of attempts necessary to constitute "due diligence"
is not subject to exact determination. However, it is quite possible
to foresee situations in which twenty or even thirty attempts would
be insufficient."' Thus, the facts of each case must be examined
to determine whether under the particular circumstances "due dili-
gence" was employed, so as to permit substituted service.
In Polansky v. Paugh,8 2 plaintiff knew that defendant had
left his last known residence prior to attempted substituted service.
The court, in a per curiam opinion, held that substituted service
by mail was violative of due process where it appeared that prior
to mailing the defendant did not reside at the stated address.
It is submitted that the court's statement should not be
accepted by the practitioner as a general principle. In the enact-
ment of CPLR 308(3), the legislature has chosen to afford a
defendant greater protection 8 than that required by federal due
77 Compare 7B McKrm.NY's CPLR 305, supp. commentary 74 (1965),
with 7B McKINNE,'s CPLR 3215, supp. commentary 155 (1965).78 1965 JUDICIAL CONTERENC REPORT, McKINrEY'S SESSiOx LAW NEWS
A80.
7945 Misc. 2d 79, 255 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct Suffolk County 1965).
80 See FIFTH REP. 266, wherein it is stated that the "due diligence" re-
quired by CPLR 308(3) is based upon "present requirements," i.e., as
required by the CPA. In this regard see Gurland v. D'Erbstein, 106 N.Y.S.2d
210 (Sup. Ct. 1951), wherein it was stated that substituted service is in
derogation of the common-law rule that process must be personally served
within the court's jurisdiction, and hence, directions pertaining to substituted
service must be strictly construed and fully carried out. Id. at 211.
81 E.g., X attempts personal service by delivery at Y'.Ts home each day
at the same time for thirty weekdays. Each time this "attempt" is made,
the plaintiff knows that the defendant will not be at home but will be at
work in another city.
8223 App. Div. 2d 643, 256 N.Y.S2d 961 (1st Dep't 1965).
8 3 Firn-rREP. 266.
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process. This is evidenced by the fact that no mailing require-
ment exists for substituted service under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.8 4 New York, on the other hand, requires mailing
plus an affixation or delivery.8 5 It would seem logical to assert,
therefore, that if there was affixation or delivery, the fact that the
mailing was made to a "last known residence" at which the de-
fendant was known not to reside would not in itself render the
entire service violative of federal due process. Rather, a violation
would arise if the notice was not "reasonably calculated" s8 to
give the defendant actual notice of the pendency of the action.
The practitioner should be encouraged in similar situations
to take advantage of the opportunities offered under CPLR
308(4) by obtaining an order for such appropriate service as
may be directed by the court. This practice would alleviate much
of the concern over potential challenges to substituted service and
instill confidence in the legal effectiveness of a chosen method
of service.
The court, in William Iser, Inc. v. Garnett,"7 stated that
failure to file proof of service made under CPLR 308(3) does not
divest the court of jurisdiction."
Under the CPA, some confusion existed as to whether a
failure to file within twenty days constituted an incurable juris-
dictional defect s9 Since the CPLR eliminated this time limit, it is
an indication that the legislature did not consider a failure to
file to be a jurisdictional defect."" The defendant's attorney,
therefore, should proceed bearing in mind that the requirement
of filing must be met only to set the time within which the defendant
must answer.
CPLR 308(4): Court ordered serice.
In Dobkin v. Chapman,91 plaintiff was injured in New York
City when struck by an automobile owned and operated by Penn-
sylvania defendants. Personal service under CPLR 308(1), au-
thorized by CPLR 313, proved unsuccessful. The same result oc-
curred under Section 253 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. U1-
84 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
85 CPLR 308(3).
88 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
8746 Misc. 2d 450, 259 N.Y.S2d 996 (Sup. Ct Nassau County
1965).88William Iser, Inc. v. Garnett, 46 Misc. 2d 450, 451, 259 N.Y.S2d
996 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
89 CPA § 231 provided that proof of substituted service must be filed
within 20 days after the order for such service was granted. See, e.g.,
Toubin v. White, 2 Misc. 2d 723, 151 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
9o Supra note 87, at 452, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 998.9146 Misc. 2d 260, 259 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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